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SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.
ACCOUNT.
Bettween Partners--Statute of Limitations-Laches.-To render the
lapse of the statutory period a bar to an action for an account by one
partner against another, it must appear that the account has been closed
for six years: Stout v. Executors of Seabrook, 30 N. J. Eq.
Great delay is a good bar in equity. A decree requiring a copartner
to account, should be denied in every case where it appears the party
seeking the account, has, by his laches, rendered it impossible for the
court to do full justice to both parties : Id.
If, in an'action for an account, the court is satisfied nothing is due to
the complainant from the defendant, a dismissal must be directed: Id.
ASSIGNMENT.
Form not regarded in Eguity.--Any writing which clearly appro-
priates a fund or property to a person, will, in equity, be esteemed an
assignment. Equity disregards mere form: Bower v. Haddon Blue
Btose Co., 30 N. J. Eq.
BANKILupTCY. See Errors and Appeals.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Draft-Acceptance.-A telegram, agreeing to accept a person's draft
for a certain sum, "for stock," is not a conditional contract, but an abso-
lute undertaking to accept and pay the same, and a party discounting
the draft on the faith of such telegram, is entitled to recover the amount
of th6 party so agreeing to accept: Coffman v. Campbell, 87 Ill.
CITIZENSHIP. See United States Courts.
COLLISION. See Neqligence.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Power of Congress over District of Columbia- Taxation- Confirma-
ti of Proceedings qtlerwise voii.-Uader the Constitution, Congress
has power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over
the District of Columbia, and this includes the power of taxation. Con-
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gress may legislate, within the district, respecting the people and pro-
perty therein, as may the legislature of any state over any of its sub-
ordinate municipalities. It may, therefore, cure irregularities, and con-
firm proceedings which, without the confirmation, would be void, because
unauthorized, provided such confirmation does not interfere with inter-
vening rights: Mattiny v. District of Columbia, S. C. U. S., October
Term 1878.
Police Powers of States-Railroals-Lighting Roads in C'ties.-The
power of police regulation throughout the state is vested in the legis-
lature, and, in the exercise of this power, railway companies may con-
stitutionally be required to light such portions of their railways as are
within a city or incorpgratc I village : Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton
Railroad Go. v. Sullivan, 32 Ohio St.
The 32d chapter of the municipal code of 1869, which authorizes city
and village councils, by ordinance, to require such lighting to be done
by the owners of such railways, and on their failure to comply with such
ordinance, authorizes the council to procure such lighting done at the
expense of such owners, is not in conflict with the constitution of the
state: Id.
When, on default of the railway company, such lighting is procured
to be done by the council, the expense of such lighting may, by the
council, be assessed or declared a lien upon any of the real estate of the
railway company within the municipality: Id.
The liability of the railway company to pay such expense, can only
be enforced by suit or action, or, in the language of the constitution,
"1 by due course of law." It is not a tax, or an assessment in the nature
of a tax for local improvements, and cannot therefore be summarily
placed upon the county duplicate and collected as a tax or. assessment
proper : Id. CO'URTS.
Power to amend their Records.-Courts always have jurisdiction over
their records to make them conform to what was actually done at the
time: The City of Elizabeth et al. v. The American Nicholson Pave-
ment Co., S. C. U. S., October Term 1878.
Power to appoint Arbitrators.-The power of a court of justice, with
the consent of the parties, to appoint arbitrators and refer a case pending
before it, is incident to all judicial administration, where the right exists
to ascertain the facts as well as to pronounce the law. £'nventiofacit
legem. In such an agreement there is nothing contrary to law or public
policy: Newcomb v. Wood, S. C. U. S., October Term 1878.
DEBTORAND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife.
Voluntary Conveyance- Where void against Creditors.-As to debts
existing at the time a voluntary conveyance is made, the law raises a
conclusive presumption of fraud, but a subsequent creditor can only
impeach such a conveyance by showing fraud in fact: Claflin v. Mess,
30 N J. Eq.
A subsequent creditor may avoid a voluntary deed on the ground that
it was nmade to defraud existing creditors, but, in order to do so, he must
show debts still outstanding which existed when the deed. alleged to be
fraudulent was made: Id.
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Payment by a grantor of all his debts existing at the time he makes
a voluntary conveyance, repels the idea that he thereby intended to
defraud his creditors: Id.
DEED. See Equity.
DOWER. See Husband and Wife.
DURESS.
Deed made under-Eguity.-On a bill to set aside a transfer of pro-
perty, alleged to have been obtained by duress, persons in whose favor
certain charges on the lands thureby conveyed were made, are necessary
parties: Probasco v. Probasco, 30 N. J. Eq.
A bill which alleges that a feeble old man has, without consideration,
transferred to his children all of his property, amounting to $45,000,
reserving to himself only an annuity of $1200, inadequately secured, and
without any provision whatever for his wife in ease she survive him :
and that such transfer was obtained from him by want of comprehension
on his part, and duress and false representations as to its effect on the
part of his children, shows sufficient equity, and will, therefore, be sus-
tained on general demurrer. Id.
EASEMENT.
Title by adverse Ler.-Title by adverse user rests upon the presump-
tion of an actual grant which has been lost: Lehigh Valley Railroad
Go. v. McFarlan, 30 N. J. Eq.
To raise the presumption of a grant where title -to an easement is
asserted, it must be shown that the use has extended over a period of
twenty years, and has been for that period continuous and peaceable:
Id.
Proof of acquiescence by the owner of the servient lands, in the
exercise of the adverse right, is indispensable in proving title to an ease-
ment by adverse user: Id.
Where the user has been exercised by force, or by permission, or in
the face of protests and in defiance of resistance, a grant cannot be pre-
sumed: Id.
Resistance by words is sufficient to prevent the presumption of a
grant of an easement: Id.
EQUITY. See Duress; Infant; Mortgage.
Chancery Jurisdiction- Trust-Factor.-In case of the bailment of
property to a factor in trust to sell, on his refusal to pay the proceeds
to the person entitled to the same, a court of chancery has no jurisdic-
tion to enforce the trust, there being a complete remedy at law in favor
of the party entitled to the money; Taylor v. Turner, 87 Ill.
Bill of Peace-Preventing ltiplicity of Suits.-A bill of peace can
only be maintained after the complainant has satisfactorily established his
right at law, or where the persons who controvert it are so numerous as to
render the intervention of this court necessary to save multiplicity of
suits: Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. McFarlan, 30 N. J. Eq.
Where several plaintiffs bring different suits at law against one de-
fendant, some for diminishing their supply of water, and another for
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backing water on his mill-wheel, no ground for interference to prevent
multiplicity of suits is shown, although the alleged injuries are done in
the use by the defendant of one stream: Id.
Deed-Signing of Grantor's Nrame by Another-The application of
the maxim, that he who asks equity must do equity, is not limited to
any particular class of cases, but may be applied whenever it is neces-
sary to the promotion of justice : Autual Benefit L~e ins. Co. v Brown,
30 N. J. Eq.
At common law signing is not necessary to the due execution of a
deed, but it is made so by the Statute of Frauds : Id.
But if the grantor's name is written in his presence and byhis direc-
tion, it is his act, and he will not be permitted, in a court of equity, to
repudiate a deed thus executed: Id.
ERRoRs AND APPEALS.
When second Writs of Error or Appeals will lie.-Second appeals or
writs of error, as the case may be, will lie in certain cases where it is
alleged that the mandate of the appellate court has not been properly
executed; but the appeal or writ of error, in such a case, will bring up
nothing for re-examination except the proceedings subsequent to the
mandate. Needful explanations may be derived from the original record,
but the re-examination cannot extend to anything that was decided in
the antecedent appeal or writ of error: Stewart v. Salamon et aL, S. C.
U. S., October Term 1878.
Supervisory Jurisdiction of Circuit Court in Bankruptc.-An appeal
will not lie from the judgment of a Circuit Court in a proceeding by a
creditor to prove his demand against the estate of a bankrupt: inger
soll v. Bourne et al., S. C. U. S., October Term 1878.
EVIDENCE.
Release of Mutual Demands-Parol Evidence not admissible to show
that certain Matters were not included.-H., in 1854, being embarrassed,
intrusted certain property to N., to be sold, and after the payment of
certain debts, the surplus to be returned to him. In 1862 the last por-
tion of the property was sold to one B., and his note, payable to N.,
taken in payment. In 1868 H. and N. executed the following mutual
release, under seal: "The undersigned, having had mutual dealings, in
former days, have reviewed the same; and though there is justly due a
balance from H. to N., yet, in consideration of love and affection and
of one dollar, we each release to the other all obligations and demands
whatsoever." At this time there remained unpaid the sum of $600 on
the note of B., which was afterwards received by N. In assumpsit,
brought by H. against N.'s executor, for the recovery of the money, it
was held that proof was not admissible that, at the time the release
was given, N. told H. that the money remaining unpaid on B.'s note
should not be included in the release. Also, that evidence was not
admissible that N., after the release and after receiving the $600, had
admitted that the money belonged to H. : Drake v. Starks, Executor,
45 Conn.
Erperts.-The opinion of experts in handwriting is evidence of low
degree : Mutual Benefit ife Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq.
VOL. XXVII.-26
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FACTOR. See Equity.
FORFEITURE.
Waiver of.-A bond, secured by a mortgage, provided that on default
in the payment of the interest thereon for thirty days after the same
had become due, the principal should, at the option of the obligee,
become payable. Held, that after the obligee had ratified several parol
extensions of the time for paying the interest, made by her agent, a subse-
quent similar extension would be deemed a waiver of the forfeiture, and
a suit at law to enforce the bond on the ground of such forfeiture would
be enjoined: Bell v. Romaine, 30 N. J. Eq.
FRAUD.
Liability of one Co-operating in,-A purchaser who co-operates with
the vendor in the misappropriation of purchase-money, which he knows
was raised for the benefit of a third person, renders himself liable to the
person defrauded to the extent of the fund misapplied with his con-
nivance: Bower v. H[addon Blue Stone Co., 30 N. J. Eq.
GUARDIAN. See Infant.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Release of Inchoate Dower-Fraud on (editors.-A release of the
wife's inchoate right of dower is a valid consideration for a conveyance
of property to her: Singree v. Welch. 32 Ohio St.
Such conveyance will not be held fraudulent and void as to the hus-
band's creditors, unless the amount of consideration received is so dis-
proportioned to the value of the wife's contingent dower as to be unrea-
sonable: Id.
So great is the difficulty of estimating the worth of contingent dower
rights, so uncertain and imaginary are the values which are the neces-
sary elements of the computation, that the court will not pronounce the
transaction fraudulent from the fact that the wife insisted upon and
received a sum greater than her dower, if the facts do not show mala
fides in her or her husband : Id.
Post-nvptial Contract.-A post-nuptial contract, made upon sufficient
consideration, and wholly or partially executed, will be sustained in
equity: Kesner v. Trigg et al., S. C. U. S., October Term 1878.
INFANT.
Property Rights of Infant-Settlement on coming of Age-Trust-
Equity.-It is the peculiar province of equity to take cognisance of
transactions growing out of relations of trust, and to prevent those hold-
ing such positions from using them and their influence for their own
aggrandizement: Berkmeyer v. .Kellerman, 32 Ohio St.
All the power, influence and skill of one occupying such a relation is
to be used for the advantage of the beneficial owner, and not for per-
sonal gain ; and all increase, gains, and profits, whether arising from
the natural increase in value of the property, or from the management
of the trustee, are the absolute property of the beneficiary : Id.
One standing in the relation of a parent and guardian in fact of a
minor, having the custody and control of such minor and of his property
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during such minority, is bound to the most scrupulous good faith in the
management of the estate, and where, on such minor's coming of age,
he attempts to make a settlement of his trust with him, a court of equity
will examine the transaction with extreme jealousy, to see that no un-
due influence has been exercised; that the parties have been put on an
equal footing, by full disclosures; and that no advantage has been
taken: Id.
Where a party occupying such a relation claims any benefit or adan-
tage from a settlement with his ward, on his coming of age, of his trust
transactions, the burden of proof is on him to show that he has made
full disclosures; that he has exercised no undue influence; and that
such settlement is fair and equitable : Id.
A conveyance by such minor, on the day he comes of age, of all his
real estate to the persons occupying such relations, in execution of such
a settlement made for such minor by others not authorized to bind it,
and while he is still under their influence and control, and not advised
of his rights, is not binding, and can only be upheld in a court of equity
by clear proof that under all the circumstances it is just and equitable:
Id.
JUDGMENT. See Set-off.
LACHES. See Account; Mandamus.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Account; Mandamus.
MANDAMUS.
Limitation in regard to issuing of-.Laches.--The limitations of the
code of civil procedure, as to the time of commencing civil actions, are
applicable, as a bar, only to suits comprehended within the civil action
of the code, which is a substitute for all such judicial proceedings as
were previously known, either as actions at law or suits in equity, and
does not embrace proceedings in mandamus: Chinn v. Trustees, etc.,
32 Ohio St.
There is, in Ohio, no statutory limitation as to the time within
which a writ of mandamus may be obtained. Nevertheless, where the
relator has, for an unreasonable time, slept upon his rights, the court
may, in the exercise of sound discretion, upon the hearing of the case
refuse to issue the writ : 
Id.
In determining what will constitute such unreasonable delay as to
justify a refusal of the writ, regard may properly be had to circum-
stances which justify such delay, to the character of the case, and the
nature of the relief demanded, and to the question whether the rights
of the defendant, or of other persons, have been prejudiced by such
delay: Id.
MORTGAGE. See Forfeiture; Subrogation.
Equity-Mistake in Deed making Conveyance subject to.-A mort-
gagee cannot avail himself of an assumption of a mortgage inserted in
a deed of the premises by the mistake of a scrivener in copying the
grantor's deed ; neither of the parties to the deed intending or being
aware of it: Stevens Institute v. Sheridan, 30 N. J. Eq.
Conveyance of Mortgaged Premises in Lots-. Order of Liabziity
Where the grantee of a mortgtgor conveys the mortgaged premises in
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different parcels, and the grantees of such parcels again convey them in
parcels-field, that the grantees of the latter parcels are liable to pay
the share of the mortgage debt chargeable on the part of the mortgaged
premises, of which the premises conveyed to them are part, in the
inverse order of conveyance to them: Hiles v. Coult, 30 N. J. Eq.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law.
Trespass in removing supposed Bncroachments on the .Hihwaym-Lia-
bility of Borough for Acts of its Ojicers.-The charter of a borough.
gave the warden and burgesses authority to order the removal of all
encroachments upon any public highway of the borough, and upon the
order not being obeyed, to cause them to be removed. The warden,
acting officially and under a vote passed by the warden and burgesses,
caused a fence of the plaintiff, along the line of the highway, to be
removed, the plaintiff not obeying an order previously made for its
removal. The fence was in good faith supposed, by the warden and
burgesses, to be an encroachment, but was Dot so in fact. In an action
of trespass brought against the borough, it was held (two judges dis-
senting): 1. That the grant of power, though to the warden and bur-
gesses, was in reality to the borough. 2 That the power to remove
encroachments was a power asked for and obtained by the borough for
its own advantage, and not for the benefit of the public. 3. That, in
the removal of encroachments, it was therefore exercising a privilege,
not discharging a governmental duty. 4. That the borough was liable
for the acts of the warden ; Weed v. Borough of Greenwich, 45 Conn.
NATIONAL BANK.
Loans on Real Bstate.-The banking law of the United States pro-
haibits national banks from loaning money on real-estate security. They
are limited to loans on personal security. Therefore, a mortgage given
to an officer of such a bank, at the time of a loan by the bank, to secure
its payment, being in effect the same as if made to the bank, is void,
and will not be enforced by the courts : Findley v .Bowen, 87 Ill.
NAVIGBLE STREAM. See Negligence.
NEGLIGENCE.
Navigable Stream- 17essel anchored without 'Lht-Pilot.-The bridge
over the Ohio river at Parkersburg, being authorized by a law of Con-
gress, the obstruction of navigation at that point, so far as it was reason-
able and necessary to the construction of the work, was justified : al-
timore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Wheeling, Parkersburg and Cincinnati
Transportation Co., 32 Ohio St.
In considering the rights of navigation, they must be viewed as lim-
ited by those rights which have been conferred upon the bridge com-
pany by the law authorizing the structure in question : .1d.
What might be negligence in leaving a barge unguarded in a navi-
gable part of the river, is not necessarily negligence if it is so left under
circumstances fairly justified by the necessities or convenience of those
engaged in the erection of the bridge : Id.
Although prudence dictates that a vessel, left during the night in the
usual route of passing craft, should display a light as a signal of warning
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to others, yet, when such vessel is moored out of the usual path of nav-
igation, where boats rarely if ever come, and in a place where the bridge
work was going on from day to day, such work at times necessitating a
temporary closing of the passage-way altogether, the absence of a light
upon a vessel so circumstanced is not necessarily negligence : Id.
Before such alleged negligence can become the fbundation of a right
to recover damages, it must appear to have been the proximate cause of
the injury occasioning such damages : Id.
When a pilot leaves the usual and customary channel of navigation,
that fact requires an increased amount of care on his part to avoid the
danger attending the new risks he undertakes. If, in pursuing such a
course, he encounters a collision, it is not a sufficient justification for
him to show that he exercised that ordinary care proper in the usual
and ordinary course of navigation : Id.
Approaching places of danger, such as the piers of a bridge, during
the night.time, a lookout is indispensable upon a steamboat. An omis-
sion in this regard is such negligence as will prevent a recovery, unless
it clearly appears that a lookout could not, by any possibility, have pre.
vented disaster: Id.
A pilot having mistaken his course, and not knowing where his boat
is, who attempts the dangerous passage of a bridge at night, at the high-
est rate of speed and without any lookout, is guilty of negligence. And
if, under such circumstances, he collides with a barge moored to abridge
pier, which is out of the usual channel of navigation, and by the col-
lision his own boat is lost, the owners of the boat cannot recover, although
the barge was without a light: Id.
OFFICE AND OFFICER.
Abolition of Office by repeal of Law creating it.-The legislature has
power to repeal a statute under which an incumbent of an office has been
appointed to and holds the office for a term not yet expired; and the
office expires with the repeal of the statute: State ez rel. Birdsey v.
Baldwin, 45 Conn.
PARTNERSHIP. See Account.
Notice by Dormant Partner.-The duty of a retiring dormant partner
to give notice of the dissolution of the partnership, is a duty which he
owes to those who before that time had some knowledge of his connec-
tion with the firm. To strangers, having no such knowledge, he owes
no such duty. As to them, he can only be charged as a partner, when
in fact he was not, by showing that he, in some way, misled them, as
that he held himself out to the world as such. or that he so held him-
self out to them: .Nussbaumer v. Becker, 87 Ills.
Money Lent to one Partner-Surety.-Where a partner borrows
money on the credit of his individual note, which is signed also by a
surety, such borrowing does not create a partnership debt, though the
money be applied to partnership purposes; and the principal of such
surety is the individual partner, with whom he joins in the execution
of the note, and not the partners generally : Peterson v. Roach, 32 Ohio
St.
POSSESSION.
Notice of Tl 'e.-The principle that the possession of land is notice
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to others of the possessor's title, is intended to protect only equitable
rights, and not to cover the puosssr's fraud, or to protect hin, where
he is without equity : Groton iSavinys Bank v. Batty, 30 N. J. Eq.
As against an innocent mortagee, notice from the possession of lands
cannot be set up by an occupant who was insolvent when he placed the
title in the name of the mortgagor, and knew, soon after the time of
the giving of the first of the two mortgages, that it bad been given,
and did not notify the mortgagee of his claims, but kept silent and per-
mnitted the mortgagor to borrow more money of the mortagee on a second
mortgage of the property, whereas if he had notified the mortgagee of
his claim when he first was made aware of the existence of the first
mortgage, the mortgagee might have collected the mortgage debt of the
mortgagor, and would have not made the second loan on security of the
mortgaged premises : Id.
RAILROAD. See Constitutional Law ; Specific Performance.
Maintenance of Order on Train-Duties of Conductor.-It is not
only the right of a conductor to expel from a train a drunken, unruly,
boisterous passenger, but when such a person endangers by his acts the
lives of people, it is the duty of such conductor to remove such passen-
ger in order to protect others from violence and danger: Railway Co.
v. Valleley, 32 Ohio St.
But this right must be reasonably exercised, and not so as to inflict
wanton or unnecessary injury upon the offending passenger, nor so as
to needlessly place him in circumstances of unusual peril: Id.
If having exercised reasonable prudence, considering the time, place,
and circumstances, as also the condition of the drunken man himself,
the conductor expels such passenger, who is afterward run over and
killed by another train not in fault, the expilsion itself is not such
proximate cause of the death as will make the couipany liable: Id.
SnT-OF.
Assignment of Judgnent.-The assignee of a judgment taking with-
out notice that the judgment debtor has any equitable right to have an
unsettled demand set off agains t will be protected. Notice that the
judgment-debtor has 2 demand against the plaintiff in the judgment is
not any ground for allowing a set off to de eat the equitable right of
the assignee: ilWman v. Kline, 87 flis.
SpECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Agreement to Cancel or Rescind Sale on Failure of Certain Condi-
tions.-If a party in selling real estate in a city guarantees that a cer-
tain street will be extended and opened through the property within
two years, and agrees that if such street is not opened within that time,
on a re-conveyance by the purchaser, to refund the money paid for the
same, with ten per cent. interest, a court of equity will specifically en-
force the contract against the vendor on a tender of a proper deed to
him: Kerfoot v. Breckenridge, 87 Ills.
Contract to build Railroad.-Specifie performance was refused of a
contract to build and equip a railroad, although the contract price was
to be paid in the stock and bonds of the company, and the estimates, &c.,
were to be made by the company. The company declared its inability
to comply with the requirements of a supplement to the act (a general law)
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under which it was incorporated, and the penalty for non-compliance there-
with was, by the supplement, declared to be the forfeiture of its charter.
It therefore, and merely for that reason, declined to proceed further under
the contract: Danforth v. Philade4phia & Cape May Railway Co., 30
N. J. Eq.
The court refused to consider the constitutionality of such supplement,
so far as the defendants were concerned, and also refused to direct them
to make estimates for the work already done under the contract: Id.
SUBROGATION.
Mortgagee-Payment of Taxes-Subroyation against second Mort-
gae.--The holder of a first mortgage discovering, during foreclosure,
that certain taxes were a lien on the premises, paramount to all encum-
brances, entered into an agreement, through his solicitor, with the
solicitor of a second mortgagee, that if he, the first mortgagee, would
pay the taxes, and the second mortgagee should buy the premises at the
foreclosure sale, he should be repaid by the second mortgagee. After
such payment, sale and purchase, the second mortgagee refused to refund
the amount of the taxes: Held, that the first mortgagee could not be
subrogated to the original lien of the township for the taxes, and have
the amount paid by him decreed a lien on the lands: Manning v.
Tuthill, 30 N. J. Eq.
SURETY. See Partnership.
TRESPASS. See Municipal Corporation.
TRUST. See Equity; Infant.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Errors and Appeals.
Jurisdiction-Citizenship of Parties-Residence not equivalent to
Citizenship.-In cases where the jurisdiction of the federal courts de-
pends upon the citizenship of the parties, the facts, essential to support
that jurisdiction, must appear somewhere in the record: Robertson v.
Cease, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
They need not necessarily be averred in the pleadings. It is sufficient
if they are in some form affirmatively shown by the record: Id.
The record in such cases includes only such portions of the transcript
as properly constitute the record upon which the court must base its
final judgment, and not papers which have been improperly inserted in
the transcript : Id.
Citizenship and residence are not synonymous terms: Id.
There is nothing either in the language or policy of the 14th amend-
ment to the constitution to support the position that the bare averment
of the residence of the parties is sufficient, prima facie, tb show juris-
diction: Id.
USURY.
Taken notice of by Court of Equity.-Althongh, by the terms imposed
upon a defendant who is let in to answer, he is prevented from setting
up usury, yet, if usury be proved, the complainant will be allowed to
recover only the amount equitably due upon his mortgage: Powers v.
Chiplain, 30 N. J. Eq.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
When Purchase-Money may be recovered back.-Where a party gave
a bond for a warranty deed to real estate, to be made on a certain day,
if the purchase-money should then be paid, it was held, that the mak-
ing of the deed and the payment of the money were concurrent acts;
and where the vendor of the land is not able to make the title he agreed
to give, at the time agreed upon, and the purchaser is ready and willing
and able to make his payment, the latter may sue for and recover back
what he has paid on the contract: Clark v. Weis, 87 Ills.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES
Jurisdiction of Eguity to settle conficting Rights to use of Streams.-
Equity has jurisdiction (and for that purpose may enjoin the further
prosecution of suits ab law) in a case which involves the relative rights,
under their charters, of two corporations to the use of the waters of the
same stream or streams; and such jurisdiction exists on the ground of
both public and private necessity. In such cases, equity is not only the
appropriate forum, but the only one where adequate relief in the premises
can be administered: Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Society for Estab-
lishing Useful Manufactures, 30 N. J. Eq.
WILL.
Unidue Influence-Inference from Circumstances without Direct Evi.
dence.-Where a testator, leaving an estate of $14,000, with no family,
made a will five days before his death and while suffering from severe
disease, by which, after giving two of his brothers $1000 each, $1000
to certain other relatives, and $1000 to a friend, he gave the residue of
his estate to a church in the town where he lived; and it appeared that
the will was drawn by H., who was a vestryman of the church and who
was the only person who conversed with him on the subject, and who
was also made sole executor ; that three brothers and a sister of the
testator lived within a few miles of him and were not notified of his
being dangerously ill until shortly before his deith and after the will
was executed; that H. was deeply interested in the welfare of the
church and a liberal contributor to its support ; that be and another
vestryman were two of the witnesses to the will and a brother-in-law of
H.. the third witness; and that the will described certain half nephews
and a half niece of the testator as his brothers and sister-it was held,
that the circumstances were such as to create a suspicion of undue in-
fluence, which might be considered by the jury without any direct
proof of such influence, and to require explanation on the part of the
persons propounding the will. Drake and others' Appeal, 45 Conn.
Quwre : Whether the vestrymen were competent witnesses to the will.
Codicil-Revocatio.-Where a testator by a codicil revokes a devise
or legacy, and grounds such revocation on the assumltion of a fact
which proves not to exist, the revocation is regarded as contingent upon
the existence of such fact and does not take effect: Dunham v. Averill,
45 Conn.
But the courts will not set aside such a revocation where it does not
appear by the will itself that it was made under the belief of the exist-
ence of such fact: .Ld.
